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THE TRANSFORMATION OF .AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860. By 
Morton J. Horwitz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
1977. Pp. xvii, 356. $16.50. 
It is in no way snide.to suggest that The Transformation of Ameri-
can Law is a long-awaited book. The brilliant portions of the overall 
argument that Morton J. Horwitz of the Harvard Law School previ-
ously laid before us only whetted appetites for the full-course feast. 
The wait has proved worthwhile. The result is a Lucullan banquet of 
memorable quality and proportions. This volume is a seminal work 
in the meaningful sense that it has reshaped the framework for the 
interpretation of American legal history. 
Although The Transformation of American Law must be read to 
appreciate its subtlety and complexity, the basic argument is 
straightforward. The author describes how in the seventy or eighty 
years after the American Revolution, industrial and mercantile 
groups associated themselves with judges and courts to transform the 
system of private law in their own interests. This alliance of com-
merce and the judiciary overthrew the precommercial and an-
tidevelopmental legal doctrines and institutions of the eighteenth 
century. The legal system became an instrument for the direct pro-
motion of economic growth. The result was that the American legal 
system underwent a major transformation which was essentially 
complete by 1850: "[l]t enabled emergent entrepreneurial and com-
mercial groups to win a disproportionate share of wealth and power 
in American society" (p. xvi). The transformed legal system became 
a major instrument in the hands of the newly powerful commercial 
groups in society. 
Common-law judges played an essential role in the emergence of 
an instrumental conception of law in the early nineteenth century; 
the judiciary began to use common law as an instrument of change. 
According to Horwitz, eighteenth-century judges had conceived of 
the common law as composed of fixed and almost immutable princi-
ples. Moreover, they believed that English case law provided an an-
swer to all matters not covered by statute (p. 8). 
What dramatically distinguished nineteen~ century law from its 
eighteenth century counterpart was the extent to which common law 
judges came to play a central role in directing the course of social 
change. Especially during the period before the Civil War, the com-
551 
552 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 76:SSI 
mon law performed at least as great a role as legislation in underwrit-
ing and channeling economic development. In fact, common law 
judges regularly brought about the sort of far-reaching changes that 
would have been regarded earlier as entirely within the powers of the 
legislature [pp. 1-2]. 
Thus nineteenth-century judges began to conceive of common-law 
adjudication as a process of making and not merely discovering legal 
rules. This led them to frame general doctrines based on a self-con-
scious consideration of social and economic policies. 
The author traces the emergence of an instrumental conception 
of the common law in such areas as property, contract, and commer-
cial law, and .the promotion of economic growth and competition. 
Contemporaries, for example, came "to regard property as an instru-
mental value in the service of the paramount goal of promoting eco-
nomic growth" (p. 53). Horwitz shows how 
the conception of property gradually changed from the eighteenth cen-
tury view that dominion over land above all conferred the power to 
prevent others from interfering with one's quiet enjoyment of property 
to the nineteenth century assumption that the essential attribute of 
property ownership was the power to develop one's property regardless 
of the injurious consequences to others [p. 99]. 
This sweeping redefinition of the norms of property ownership was 
manifested, for example, in tort law with the displacement of tradi-
tional doctrines of strict liaJ,ility and just compensation by the negli-
gence standard, which allowed greater freedom for enterprising but 
hazardous uses of property. 
This development was also reflected in the revised legal status of 
the corporate franchise. As a legal presumption in favor of competi-
tion emerged in the common law for the first time, franchise owners 
of property lost the right to exclude competition (p.111 ). Within a 
generation after 1820, Horwitz observes, 'judges and jurists had 
come to agree that a policy in favor of competition was a sine qua 
non for further economic development" (p. 139), and his extensive 
discussion of the Charles River Bridge case (pp. 130-39) well illus-
trates this theme. 
By the time of the Civil War, procommercial doctrines had sup-
planted anticommercial rules in much of American law. Judicial rec-
ognition of newly emergent actuarial concepts resulted in 
liberalization of the law governing marine and fire insurance. State 
legislatures repealed or modified laws against usury in response to 
the demands of the emerging market system. In some areas where 
state judges and legislatures resisted pressure for change, the federal 
judiciary established procommercial doctrines by overriding state 
law. Horwitz describes the successful efforts of federal judges to give 
national effect to rules protecting holders of negotiable instruments 
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despite the existence of conflicting state law (pp. 220-26). These de-
velopments in legal doctrine were accompanied by changes in the 
character of the legal profession and its role in society. For example, 
commercial lawyers who specialized in such new fields as marine-
insurance litigation became the leaders of the bar and entered into 
an alliance with the bench and commercial interests to promote eco-
nomic development and to reduce the power of juries in civil 
matters. 
The fruition of an instrumental conception of the common law in 
promoting economic development was accompanied, especially after 
1850, by what Horwitz describes as the rise of legal formalism. Once 
the creation of new common-law rules supportive of economic devel-
opment was achieved, a flexible and instrumental conception of law 
was no longer needed (p. 254). The commercial interests and the ju-
diciary recognized that it had become essential to give common-law 
rules the appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexor-
able. The author suggests that the deep pressure toward formalism in 
nineteenth-century law was ultimately designed to preserve the ad-
vantages secured in the transformation of the law. Having achieved 
a substantial redistribution of wealth and power on behalf of the 
more aggressive elements of society, the procommercial forces were 
not interested in further exercises of instrumentalism which could 
only work to their detriment. Consequently, private law acquired the 
previously contrasting antiutilitarian and formalistic cast of public 
law, which had protected the commercial and entrepreneurial inter-
ests from legislative encroachments on property rights (pp. 255, 259). 
Horwitz concludes that "the paramount social condition that is nec-
essary for legal formalism to flourish in a society is for the powerful 
groups in that society to have a great interest in disguising and sup-
pressing the inevitably political and redistributive functions of law" 
(p. 266). 
The history of substantive law is the most neglected aspect of 
American legal history. Thus Horwitz's history of developments in 
the common law is one of the most important contributions of the 
volume. It is immensely useful to have available an explanation of 
what a series of statutory changes and common-law decisions appar-
ently meant. The author is particularly aware of the limits of consti-
tutional history as a guide to understanding changes in the American 
legal system in the nineteenth century (p. xii). In contrast to the 
usual emphasis on developments in constitutional law, Horwitz's fo-
cus on the relationship between private law and economic change 
evidences "the more regular instances in which law, economy, and 
society interacted" (p. xii). This approach is ultimately a most fruit-
ful and enlightened form of legal history, but the intellectual and 
scholarly talents necessary to carry out such a task successfully are 
great. 
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Horwitz is well aware of the importance of translating the myste-
rious science of the law into more general and accessible categories 
for professional historians and other nonlegally trained scholars (p. 
xi). Yet it is debatable whether he has succeeded in his goal of gen-
eral communication. While the general thesis and many of the chap-
ters are readily comprehensible, parts of the volume, especially the 
lengthy chapter on developments in contract law, are very difficult 
reading either for practicing historians or for generally educated 
readers. In my view only specialists will be able to understand and 
evaluate the validity ofHorwitz's major discussion of how the law of 
contract was transformed in an increasingly commercial society by 
the development of extensive markets and how the equitable concep-
tion of contract law was overthrown by the will theory after 1825. 
The chapters treating substantive law are formidable reading. The 
situation is not helped by the tendency of Horwitz and other legal 
historians to slight the existing historical literature in their writing of 
legal history.1 Historians will find few references in this volume to 
the traditional topics of antebellum history. While this is in many 
ways a tribute to the originality ofHorwitz's analysis, it also makes it 
too easy for general historians to ignore his contributions. It will be a 
great tragedy if economic, political, and intellectual historians of an-
tebellum America, who are ultimately the largest audience for The 
Transformation of American Law, do not make the necessary efforts 
to assimilate the author's findings into their understanding of the 
era. 
Historians have an inherent skepticism about books which em-
phasize great transformations over time and which focus on dichoto-
mies between an earlier and later experience. Almost any book 
dealing with transformations seems to exaggerate the degree of 
change from a relatively primitive past to a more modem present.2 
While the notion of a transformation makes for a good title, it leads 
scholars with more familiarity with an earlier period, such as the 
colonial era of American history, to question the accuracy of presen-
tation of their special field. Quotations such as the following only 
add to their skepticism: "By 1820 the legal landscape of America 
bore only the faintest resemblance to what existed forty years earlier. 
While the words were often the same, the structure of thought had 
dramatically changed and with it the theory of law" (p. 30). 
1. For my discussion of'similar tendencies in recent writings of Julius Goebel, Jr., and 
William E. Nelson, see Flaherty, Book Review, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1973) (review of J. 
GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: VOLUME I, ANTECl!D· 
ENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971)); Flaherty, Book Review, 26 u. TORONTO L.J. 109 
(1976) (review ofW. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF 
LEGAL CHANGE ON MAsSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975)). 
2. See, e.g., R. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO YANKEE (1967). 
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Although I am ultimately persuaded that major changes occurred 
in the American legal system in the seventy or eighty years after the 
American Revolution, I am not as certain that some form of an in-
strumental conception of law did not already exist in the colonial 
era. Lack of evidence and lack of research contribute to the uncer-
tainty. There are very few reported judicial opinions for the colonial 
era of American history. Thus, although the judicial decisions and 
jury verdicts in particular cases are available, the reasoning normally 
is not. In addition, no scholars have studied colonial civil litigation 
intensively enough to reach appropriate conclusions about the pres-
ence or strength of an instrumental conception of law during this 
time. Some of us who work in early American legal history believe 
that there is at least the possibility that the colonial judiciary was 
acting in an instrumental fashion in many of their decisions and sus-
pect that antidevelopmental attitudes were not as common in the 
eighteenth century in the American colonies as Horwitz suggests. 
There is also the danger that the notion of a transformation will 
suggest much faster-paced changes than actually occurred. The 
transformation of the common law in the hands of the early nine-
teenth-century judiciary was in fact very slow-paced, a fact which 
Horwitz acknowledges on several occasions: "The effort to free prop-
erty law from its antidevelopmental premises was still very much a 
struggle at mid-century" (p. 40).3 As Horwitz mentions in connection 
with the development of an aspect of contract law, there was "a pe-
riod of uneasy compromise between the old learning and the new'' 
(p. 170), and the broad validity of this theme is suggested by the 
work of Chancellor James Kent of New York, one of America's pre-
mier jurists, whose opinions in the 1820s owed more to the old 
school than the new.4 The late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies had a transitional character for many aspects of private law (p. 
170). 
There is a further risk that the notion of the transformation of 
American common law in the hands of the judiciary in the seventy 
or eighty years after the American Revolution will neglect the seem-
ing inevitability of such changes. The Revolution had a liberating 
effect on society and removed the restrictions on economic develop-
ment imposed under the British colonial rule. The aftermath of the 
Revolution also saw the beginnings in the United States of the pro-
cess of industrial and economic growth, which had already begun in 
England. The gradual introduction of turnpikes, canals, railroads, 
and private corporations made changes in the law and legal system 
3. Other statements recognizing that the transformation in property law was not completed 
by mid-century can be found at pp. 104-05, 108. 
4. See, e.g., Horwitz's analysis of Chancellor Kent's opinions dealing with the right of the 
owner of a franchise from the state to exclude competition (pp. 124-26). 
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inevitable. Horwitz's The Traneformation of American Law is in fact 
a documentation of the transitions and changes which occurred with 
the beginnings of industrialization. The surprising fact is that this 
transformation was so slow-paced, convoluted, and confused. State 
courts in particular had to be dragged along in certain areas of sub-
stantive law by the commercial interests. It is not clear that the au-
thor has satisfactorily resolved the degree of interaction between 
economic changes and the legal system, although he does on occa-
sion recognize that eighteenth-century legal assumptions were un-
dermined by "a startling variety of complicated economic changes" 
(p. 114). He observes, for example, that "the most decisive influence 
on the courts" in terms of the development of new attitudes toward 
competition and economic innovation was probably the advent of 
the railroad (p. 137). It would also be useful to know more about 
comparable. developments in English common law. A number of 
new legal developments do appear in both England and America at 
the same time-for example, the frrst recognition of expectation 
damages after 1790 (p. 174) and the determination of the legal liabil-
ity of employers for negligent injuries of workers in the 1830s and 
1840s (pp. 208-09). Examination of English developments might 
shed light on the qu~stion whether instrumentalism was a necessary 
conceptual framework for legal change. 
The Traneformation of American Law is full of outstanding re-
search and stimulating hypotheses and generalizations. Each chapter 
uses case after case to trace the details of changing conceptions in the 
common law. Even the approximately eighty pages of learned foot-
notes contain many substantive discussions. It is unfortunately be-
yond the capacity of any single reviewer to test Horwitz's evidence at 
present; his overall conceptions and specific conclusions will have to 
be evaluated over time. 5 If this learned volume does not stand the 
test of time and achieve the greatness that is already predicted for it, 
it will at least require an army of researchers to prove the author 
wrong. 
.David H. Flaherty 
Professor of History 
The University of Western 
Ontario 
5. It may be instructive to reflect in this connection on the findings of one legal historian 
who tested the use of primary evidence in a recent monograph. See Zobel, Essay Review, 50 
NEW ENGLAND Q. 138 (1977) (review of w. NELSON, supra note 1). 
